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I. INTRODUCTION

A pay-for-delay drug settlement, also called a reverse payment
settlement, occurs when a brand name pharmaceutical company
agrees to pay the maker of a similar generic drug to delay the release
59
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of the generic drug into the stream of commerce, thereby allowing
the brand name pharmaceutical company to eliminate competition for
an extended period of time.1 These agreements allow both the brand
name manufacturer and the generic manufacturer to profit immensely.2 The brand name manufacturer’s “prices stay high, and the brand
and generic share the benefits of the brand’s monopoly profits.”3
These settlements cost the American public an estimated $3.5 billion
per year.4 Further, reverse payment settlements on average prevent
generic drugs from entering the stream of commerce for an additional
seventeen months.5 As a result, the public is missing out on generic
drugs that could be up to ninety percent cheaper than the brand name
version.6
This Comment intends to show that reverse payment settlements
are unduly burdensome on interstate commerce, and thus it is within
the purview of Congress to regulate these types of agreements. First,
this Comment will explore the statutory framework through which
pay-for-delay settlements became prominent. Next, this Comment
discusses the history of pay-for-delay litigation and the underlying
patent and antitrust laws that courts have focused on in making their
decisions. After the necessary background is established, this Comment explores the commerce clause of the United States Constitution7 and argues that pay-for-delay settlements are unduly burdensome on interstate commerce, and therefore, either Congress should
illegalize the settlements through legislation or the Supreme Court

1.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS
COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 1 (Jan. 2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-payoffs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staffstudy/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf .
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Id. at 2.
5.
Id.
6.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 2. By keeping drug prices high, reverse
payment settlements “protect at least $20 billion in sales of brand-name pharmaceuticals
from generic competition.” Id.
7.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. The text of the commerce clause states that “[t]he
Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”
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should find them unconstitutional.8 Finally, the possible benefits of
such legislation are discussed.
II. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, outlines the procedures
that must be used by generic drug companies in order to gain Food &
Drug Administration (FDA) approval and enter a new drug into the
stream of commerce.9 Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic manufacturer can file an “abbreviated new drug application”10 to attempt
to enter their drug into the market prior to the expiration of brand
name patents.11 To gain early entry, the generic company must include in their application a certification stating that the brand name
patent “is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or
sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted.”12 If the
first applicant for a new drug submits an application that contains all
of the required materials, they can then receive a “180-day exclusivity period” during which other generic manufacturers of the same
drug cannot market their product.13

8.
Merck, a brand name drug manufacturer, filed a petition for certiorari on Friday,
August 24, 2012, requesting that the Supreme Court review the conflict over these agreements in light of a recent Third Circuit decision. See Lyle Denniston, “K-Dur” Fight Reaches Court (UPDATED), SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 24, 2012, 10:46 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/08/k-dur-fight-reaches-court/. Shortly thereafter, the Federal Trade Commissioned filed a petition for certiorari requesting that the Supreme Court
review an Eleventh Circuit pay-for-delay decision. See Alison Frankel, FTC Cert Petition
Puts SCOTUS in Pay-for-Delay Pickle, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Oct. 8, 2012),
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/10/08/ftc-cert-petition-puts-scotus-in-pay-fordelay-pickle/. The Supreme Court addressed the anticompetitive effects of pay-for-delay
settlements in F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). This decision will be discussed
later in this Comment.
9.
See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
10.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
11.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 3.
12.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(vii)(IV).
13.
Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (“If the application contains a certification described in
subclause (IV) paragraph (2)(A)(vii) and is for a drug for which a previous application has
been submitted under this subsection containing such a certification, the application shall be
made effective not earlier than one hundred and eighty days after the date . . . of the first
commercial marketing of the drug (including the commercial marketing of the listed drug)
by any first applicant.”).
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This 180-day exclusivity period paved the way for the emergence of reverse payment settlements.14 The exclusivity period gives
generic drug manufacturers an incentive to file abbreviated new drug
applications and challenge the validity of brand name patents in order
to secure a very profitable period of time where their generic drug is
the only one on the market.15 Once an application is submitted, the
brand name pharmaceutical companies often “challenge the generic’s
declaration, and litigation ensues between the brand-name and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers to determine whether the relevant
patents are valid and infringed.”16 Rather than deal with the risks of
litigation, brand name pharmaceutical companies and generic drug
manufacturers then frequently agree to pay-for-delay settlements,
thereby allowing the brand name company to remain the only supplier on the market and keep prices high, while also garnering for the
generic manufacturer enormous profits from the settlements.17
III. UNITED STATES PATENT LAW
Patent law plays an integral role in the application of the HatchWaxman Act and the litigation that has occurred regarding reverse
payment settlements. Under the U.S. Patent Act of 1952, “[w]hoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.”18 By patenting an invention,
the inventor gains “the right to exclude others from profiting by the
patented invention.”19 This exclusion includes the “making, using,
offering for sale, or selling [of] the invention.”20 The right to exclude
is further protected by the ability to bring a cause of action for copyright infringement.21 Any unauthorized making, selling, or using of a
14.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 3.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Id. (“Given the costs and potential uncertainty of patent litigation, brand-name
and generic pharmaceutical companies sometimes settle their patent litigation before a final
court decision.”).
18.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
19.
See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980). See also
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948) (“[T]he precise terms of the
[patent] grant define the limits of a patentee's monopoly and the area in which the patentee is
freed from competition of price, service, quality or otherwise.”).
20.
35 U.S.C. § 154.
21.
35 U.S.C. § 271.
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patented invention is an infringement on the patent that may result in
injunctive or monetary relief for the inventor.22
In the context of pharmaceutical companies, a drug is considered
a patentable invention that grants the inventor the right to exclude.23
Thus, under the typical reverse payment settlement scenario, a brand
name pharmaceutical company attempts to preserve its right to exclude competition from profiting by the patented drug, while the generic manufacturer tries to circumvent the patent by either challenging its validity or arguing non-infringement.24
IV. UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW
Additionally, much of the litigation regarding the pay-for-delay
controversy has focused on antitrust law. Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”25
The Supreme Court has previously held that the standard for determining whether there is a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act is
whether the acts unreasonably restrain competition.26 For example,
horizontal price fixing, or the act of competing entities fixing prices
at a specified level, has been found to be a per se unreasonable restraint on competition.27
With regards to reverse payment settlement litigation, it is generally argued that the settlement creates an unreasonable restraint on
competition by horizontal competitors forcing the generic drugs out
of the market and essentially monopolizing the brand name version

22.
Id.
23.
Id. § 271(e)(2)(A).
24.
E.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003).
25.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
26.
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978) (“Unreasonableness under that test could be based either (1) on the nature or character of the
contracts, or (2) on surrounding circumstances giving rise to the inference or presumption
that they were intended to restrain trade and enhance prices.”). See also State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“Some types of restraints, however, have such predictable and
anti-competitive effect, and such limited potential for precompetitive benefit, that they are
deemed unlawful per se.”).
27.
See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982). The
Court in Arizona held that setting uniform prices, setting price maximums, and setting price
minimums are all per se violations of antitrust law. Id.
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of the drug.28 Judge Posner eloquently explained the typical scenario
in Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc.:
Suppose a seller obtains a patent that it knows is almost certainly invalid (that is, almost certain not to
survive a judicial challenge), sues its competitors, and
settles the suit by licensing them to use its patent in
exchange for their agreeing not to sell the patented
product for less than the price specified in the license.
In such a case, the patent, the suit, and the settlement
would be devices—masks—for fixing prices, in violation of antitrust law.29
V. THE TENSION BETWEEN PATENT LAW AND ANTITRUST LAW
The policy behind both patent law and antitrust law is founded in
“the ultimate goal of stimulating competition and innovation.”30
However, essentially opposite means are used by each of these bodies of law to achieve the same end. Antitrust law attempts to prevent
business practices that unreasonably restrain trade and allow business
entities to essentially monopolize markets, whereas patent law grants
individuals the right to exclude others from profiting by their invention.31 In simpler terms, antitrust law lets external competition in
while patent law keeps external competition out.32 Because these two
areas of law seem to be at odds with each other, “the exclusionary
power of a patent may seem incongruous with the goals of antitrust
law, [and thus] a delicate balance must be drawn between the two
regulatory schemes.”33 Courts trying to sustain this “delicate balance” must be careful to recognize and protect the rights of the patent
holder while also not “[extending] the patentee's monopoly beyond

28.
E.g., Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 908 (holding that a reverse payment settlement
is essentially a horizontal agreement between drug manufacturers to reduce output and eliminate competition, thus rendering it an unreasonable restraint on trade).
29.
Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentec Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (N.D. Ill.
2003).
30.
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 201 (2d Cir. 2005).
31.
Id. at 201-02.
32.
See id.
33.
Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1067 (11th Cir.
2005).
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its statutory right to exclude.”34 The interplay between these two
seemingly conflicting bodies of law has been at the heart of the
courts’ reasoning in every pay-for-delay case to date.35
VI. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS OF NEW DRUGS
Much of the motivation behind brand name drug manufacturers
entering into these deals is likely to recoup some of the losses that are
handed to them as a result of the massive costs of research and development of drug innovation.36 In innovating new drugs, “[research
and development] decisions have very long-term ramiﬁcations, and
the impact of market or public policy changes may not be fully realized for many years.”37 Pay-for-delay settlements fit perfectly into
this trend, as the decision to enter into one of these settlements is essentially a business judgment of the drug manufacturer that is slowly
causing a major shift in public policy.38 In simpler terms, drug manufacturers enter into reverse payment settlements because they will
allow them to keep prices high and make up for the costs lost from
research and development, thereby shifting the burden of these costs
onto consumers, in turn resulting in a strong public sentiment by the
FTC and other groups that these settlements must be prevented.39
To fully grasp the reasons behind the high costs of innovating
new drugs, it is important to have a general overview of the drug development process. Generally, the process begins with the discovery
phase, which “result[s] in the synthesis of compounds that are tested
in assays and animal models.”40 After discovery, human testing occurs in three phases.41 The first phase involves the testing of healthy
individuals in order to gather data on “absorption, distribution, metabolic effects, excretion, and toxicity of the compound.”42 Phase two
34.
Id.
35.
E.g., id. at1067.
36.
See Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 180
(2003), available at
http://moglen.law.columbia.edu/twiki/pub/LawNetSoc/BahradSokhansanjFirstPaper/22JHea
lthEcon151_drug_development_costs_2003.pdf.
37.
Id. at 152.
38.
See id.
39.
See id.
40.
Id. at 155.
41.
See DiMasi et al., supra note 36, at 155.
42.
Id.
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involves testing on usually hundreds of individuals with the targeted
disease or condition in order to gather data on success rates and safety.43 Phase three consists of large-scale testing on usually thousands
of individuals in order to definitively determine the effectiveness of
the drug and the possible side effects.44 Once the testing is satisfactorily completed, the drug manufacturer can then use this data in submitting a New Drug Application.45
Based on a 2000 study, the estimated average research and development cost per drug is $802 million.46 Furthermore, there is an
obvious trend in the data suggesting that these numbers will continue
to rise.47 Between 1973 and 2000, “the average amount that surveyed
firms reported spending on research and development of new molecular entities increased nearly sixfold in real terms.”48 The rising costs
can be attributed to six main reasons: an increase in drugs that fail
human testing, longer human testing phases, more drugs “intended to
treat chronic and degenerative diseases,” expensive technology involved in testing, the “commercialization of basic research,” and
longer discovery periods.49 Based on the lofty and continually rising
estimates of research and development costs to drug manufacturers, it
is clear that part of the motivation behind reverse payment settlements is to recoup these costs. This all leads back to the original dispute: is it fair for American citizens to shoulder the burden of these
costs rather than the drug manufacturers?
VII. PAST LITIGATION FAVORING PAY-FOR-DELAY SETTLEMENTS
The vast majority of federal circuit courts have found pay-fordelay settlements to be “not presumptively anti-competitive.”50 The
43.
Id. at 156.
44.
Id.
45.
Id.
46.
See DiMasi et al., supra note 36, at 180. In 1987, the same group estimated that
the cost of research and development was $231 million. Id. The cost today is likely even
higher than the 2000 estimates due to this trend of increasing costs. See id.
47.
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 21 (2006), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-drugr-d.pdf.
48.
Id.
49.
Id. at 22. It is important to also note that “faster FDA reviews, regulatory
changes, and speedier methods of identifying potential R&D failures” have worked in the
opposite direction to slow the rising costs. Id.
50.
Frankel, supra note 8.
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circuit courts have primarily decided the issue as a question of antitrust and patent validity.51
In Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit introduced the “scope of the patent” test into pay-fordelay litigation in upholding these types of agreements.52 Valley
Drug Co. involved a successful drug developed by Abbott Laboratory, Hytrin, which is prescribed to combat hypertension and an enlarged prostate.53 Geneva and Zenith, both generic drug manufacturers, filed abbreviated new drug applications in order to market their
generic versions of Hytrin.54 Patent infringement lawsuits soon followed.55 However, prior to trial, Abbott came to an agreement with
Zenith where Zenith would receive “$3 million up front, $3 million
after three months, and $6 million every three months thereafter until
March 1, 2000” in exchange for Zenith not marketing their generic
version of Hytrin for a specified period of time.56 Additionally, Abbott entered into a similar agreement with Geneva, agreeing to pay
them $4.5 million per month to withhold their drug from the market.57
While the court did recognize that the settlements had an exclusionary effect on the drug market, it held that Abbott’s patent granted
them the right to exclude others from utilizing the drug until its expiration, and thus the reverse payment settlements were lawful.58 This
case is an excellent illustration of the massive dollar amounts involved in these agreements and the intermingling of various areas of
law in analyzing their legality.
51.
Id.
52.
See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir.
2003).
53.
Id. at 1298.
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Id. at 1300. Specifically, Zenith agreed not to market a generic version of the
drug until Abbott’s patent expired, or until a different manufacturer introduced a generic
version into the market. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1300.
57.
Id. Similar to the Zenith agreement, Geneva agreed not to market a generic
version until a different manufacturer introduced a generic version, Abbott’s patent expired,
or Geneva obtained a court judgment finding that the patent was invalid or that the Geneva’s
generic did not infringe upon the patent. Id.
58.
Id. at 1308. It is worth noting that one of Abbott’s patents at issue was found to
be invalid prior to this court’s decision. However, this did not impact the court’s decision
since “the reasonableness of agreements under the antitrust laws are [sic] to be judged at the
time the agreements are entered into.” Id. at 1306.
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The Eleventh Circuit came to a similar conclusion in ScheringPlough Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, again utilizing the
“scope of the patent” test.59 In this case, Schering, a brand name
manufacturer, marketed K-Dur 20, a drug used to treat high blood
pressure and congestive heart disease.60 Upsher-Smith laboratories
sought to introduce Klor Con M20, a generic version of the drug.61
Schering subsequently sued for patent infringement.62 The day before
the trial was set to begin, the companies entered into a complex settlement agreement whereby Upsher-Smith agreed not to market their
generic product for a specified period of time and agreed to give
Schering the licenses to five other Upsher products in exchange for
millions of dollars in royalties.63
The court reasoned that “[w]hat we must focus on is the extent
to which the exclusionary effects of the agreement fall within the
scope of the patent's protection. Here, we find that the agreements
fell well within the protections of the '743 patent, and were therefore
not illegal.”64 Thus, the anticompetitive effects of the settlements
were permissible as a result of Schering’s patent rights.65
The Second Circuit further expanded on the “scope of the patent” test in In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation.66 Here, the
court found that so long as the reverse payment settlement did not
discourage the marketing of “non-infringing or unrelated products”
59.
See Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th
Cir. 2005).
60.
Id. at 1058.
61.
Id.
62.
Id. at 1059.
63.
Id. at 1060.
64.
Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1076 (citations omitted).
65.
Notwithstanding the court’s holding, the court seems to have recognized that
had the payments by Scherer to Upsher-Smith been made solely for the purposes of delaying
the generic’s entry into the market, rather than for the licenses, the settlement may have been
illegal. Id. at 1071.
66.
See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 216 (2d Cir. 2005).
This case involved Imperial Chemical Industries, a drug manufacturer that produced a breast
cancer drug called Tamoxifen. Id. at 193. Four months after Imperial’s patent was approved,
Barr, a generic manufacturer, filed an abbreviated new drug application. Id. Imperial subsequently filed a patent infringement suit against Barr. Id. The district court found that the
initial patent was invalid due to Imperial’s non-disclosure of information regarding animal
testing. Id. While an appeal was pending, the two parties entered into a reverse payment
settlement whereby Barr agreed not to market its generic version until the patent expired in
exchange for twenty-one million dollars and a non-exclusive license to sell Tamoxifen under
Barr’s label. Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d at 193-94.
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or prevent other generic manufacturers from entering the market,
there was no violation of antitrust laws.67
The Federal Circuit also adopted the “scope of the patent” test in
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation.68 The court
concisely summed up the test in stating that a “settlement is not unlawful if it serves to protect that to which the patent holder is legally
entitled—a monopoly over the manufacture and distribution of the
patented invention.”69
As the various circuit courts have noted in their opinions upholding pay-for-delay settlements, a patentee’s right to exclude essentially shields them from antitrust scrutiny under the “scope of the patent”
test.70
VIII. PAST LITIGATION STRIKING DOWN PAY-FOR-DELAY
SETTLEMENTS
In contrast to the majority of the United States Courts of Appeals, the Sixth Circuit in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation
found that reverse payment settlements are a per se illegal restraint of
trade.71 The drug at issue in this case was Cardizem CD, a drug produced by Hoechst Marion Roussel (HRM) that is used to treat angina
and hypertension, as well as for prevention of heart attacks and
strokes.72 Andrx filed an abbreviated new drug application seeking
the valuable 180-day exclusivity period.73 Shortly thereafter, HRM
filed a patent infringement suit against Andrx, arguing that the generic version of Cardizem CD infringed upon HRM’s patent in the “dis-

67.
Id. at 215.
68.
See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2008). In this case, Bayer, a brand name manufacturer, owned a patent for the active ingredient in Cipro, a drug that fights bacterial illnesses. Id. at 1328. Barr filed an abbreviated
new drug application, arguing that the patent was invalid based on the obviousness of the
ingredient. Id. Bayer sued Barr for patent infringement, which resulted in a reverse payment
settlement being entered into just before trial began. Id. The settlement paid Barr $49.1
million in exchange for Barr not marketing the generic drug until after the patent expired. Id.
at 1329. Further, “Bayer agreed to either supply Barr with Cipro for resale or make quarterly
payments.” In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at 1329.
69.
Id. at 1337.
70.
E.g., id.
71.
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003).
72.
Id. at 901.
73.
Id. at 902.
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solution profile” of Cardizem CD.74 During the course of this litigation, the FDA gave tentative approval to Andrx’s generic drug, thereby eliciting a reverse payment settlement between the parties just
nine days later.75 Under the agreement, Andrx agreed not to market
their generic version of Cardizem CD until certain conditions were
met in exchange for millions of dollars in payments from HRM.76
Approximately two years after the settlement, the FDA approved
Andrx’s revised abbreviated new drug application.77 Shortly thereafter, Andrx began marketing its generic product, Cartia XT.78 According to the court, “Cartia XT has sold for a much lower price than
Cardizem CD and has captured a substantial portion of the market.”79
The court held that there was “no escaping the conclusion that the
Agreement, all of its other conditions and provisions notwithstanding, was, at its core, a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition
in the market for Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a
classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.”80 In making this
determination, the court noted that the agreement not only delayed
Andrx’s entry into the market, but it delayed other generic drug manufacturers from entering the market until Andrx’s 180-day exclusivity period had run, thereby stifling any possibility of competition.81
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
In re Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 902-03. The agreement specified that Andrx
could not market a generic version of Cardizem CD until one of three conditions were met:
the patent court determined that Andrx did not infringe on the “dissolution profile” patent
owned by HRM, HRM and Andrx entered into a license agreement, or HRM entered into a
license agreement with a third party. Id. The settlement paid Andrx $40 million per year
once they received FDA approval, and $100 million a year after the patent litigation was
either resolved in Andrx’s favor or dismissed by HRM. Id. at 903.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
In re Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 903.
80.
Id. at 907.
81.
Id. The reverse payment settlement at issue in this case contained an agreement
that Andrx would not “relinquish or transfer” the rights to their 180-day exclusivity period,
thus ensuring that no other generic drug manufacturers could enter the market during this
period. Id. In fact, Andrx brought suit against Biovail, another generic manufacturer that
filed an abbreviated new drug application, seeking a clarification of its 180-day exclusivity
rights and thus seeking to prevent Biovail’s drug from entering the market. See Andrx
Pharms. Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The D.C. Circuit Court reversed the district court’s motion to dismiss, holding that Biovail could allege an antitrust
injury because Andrx’s agreement to retain their rights in the 180-day exclusivity period
“could reasonably be viewed as an attempt to allocate market share and preserve monopolistic conditions.” See id. at 811.
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The court was careful to point out that profiting from the monopoly
that arose from a patent was not unlawful, but rather it was the
strengthening of that monopoly through payments that rendered it an
unreasonable restraint on trade.82
IX. THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
On July 16, 2012, the Third Circuit in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation found reverse payment settlements to be a violation of antitrust laws.83 This was the first time since In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation in 2003 that a circuit court invalidated a pay-for-delay
settlement.84
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation involved the same set of facts as
Schering-Plough Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission,85 except that
the lawsuit was brought on behalf of “a class of plaintiffs consisting
of forty-four wholesalers and retailers who purchased K-Dur directly
from Schering.”86 In holding that reverse payment settlements were
unlawful, the court expressly rejected the “scope of the patent” test.87
The court reasoned that, when the “scope of the patent” test is applied, there is a presumption that the patent is valid and that the holder of the patent would have prevailed in the ensuing patent infringement litigation.88 In reality, it is unknown whether the generic drugs
actually infringed on the patent, and thus it becomes impossible to
determine whether the pay-for-delay agreements were actually within
the scope of the patent.89 Practically speaking, “reverse payments
enable the holder of a patent that the holder knows is weak to buy its
way out of both competition with the challenging competitor and
possible invalidation of the patent.”90 As a result, the consumer is
hurt by higher brand name prices and a lack of generic alternatives—
82.
In re Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 908.
83.
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
84.
See In re Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d 896.
85.
See Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir.
2005).
86.
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 208.
87.
Id. at 214.
88.
Id.
89.
See id. at 215. A 2002 study by the FTC showed that the generic drug manufacturers prevailed in 73% of Hatch-Waxman patent challenges that did not end in a pay-fordelay settlement. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 3. This further calls into question
whether pay-for-delay settlements are actually within the “scope of the patent.” Id.
90.
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 215.
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the exact opposite of what the Hatch-Waxman Act was intended to
do.91 In place of the “scope of the patent” test, the Third Circuit articulated that:
[T]he finder of fact must treat any payment from a patent holder to a generic patent challenger who agrees
to delay entry into the market as prima facie evidence
of an unreasonable restraint of trade, which could be
rebutted by showing that the payment (1) was for a
purpose other than delayed entry or (2) offers some
pro-competitive benefit.92
Because this decision differs drastically from the earlier precedents
set by the Federal Circuits, the Supreme Court was forced to address
some of these issues.93
In F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court attempted to resolve a controversy involving Watson Pharmaceuticals, Paddock, and
Solvay.94 Solvay produced a form of testosterone gel, and agreed to
pay twelve million dollars to Paddock and nineteen to thirty million
dollars annually to Watson for nine years in exchange for Paddock
and Watson delaying the release of their generic testosterone gel into
the stream of commerce.95 The FTC filed a complaint, alleging that
Solvay violated antitrust law by “unlawfully agreeing ‘to share in
Solvay's monopoly profits, abandon their patent challenges, and refrain from launching their low-cost generic products to compete with
AndroGel for nine years.’”96 The district court dismissed the lawsuit,
and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal.97
91.
Id. at 217. The court notes that the Hatch-Waxman Act intended challenges of
patents by generic manufacturers to result in increased competition and, in turn, lower priced
generic drug options for the consumer. Id.
92.
Id. at 218. The court foresaw that it would be rare for a reverse payment settlement to have a pro-competitive benefit. See id. One example the court offered is if a “modest” settlement allows a near-bankrupt generic drug manufacturer to stay in business and
eventually market a generic drug, thereby increasing competition. In re K-Dur Antitrust
Litig., 686 F.3d at 218.
93.
F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013) (“Because different courts
have reached different conclusions about the application of the antitrust laws to HatchWaxman-related patent settlements, we granted the FTC's petition.”). See Frankel, supra
note 8.
94.
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223.
95.
Id. at 2229.
96.
Id. at 2230.
97.
Id. at 2225.
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The Supreme Court disagreed and held, in a five-to-three decision, that the FTC should have had the opportunity to prove their antitrust claim.98 The Court articulated five main reasons for their decision. First, despite recognizing the value of promoting settlements,
the Court found that reverse payment settlements have “potential for
genuine adverse effects on competition.”99 The Court noted that a
reverse payment settlement, as discussed earlier, allows the brand
name manufacturer and the generic manufacturer to profit, while the
consumer loses. Second, the Court found that the anticompetitive
settlements will not always be justified.100 In some cases, the payments may be compensation for other services that the generic manufacturer has agreed to provide for the brand name manufacturer, including distribution of the patented item. However, these justifications will not always be present, and a plaintiff should be allowed an
opportunity to prove its case.101 Third, the Court found that when
there is a reverse payment settlement in place, the brand name manufacturer likely will have the power to charge prices higher than the
competitive level, damaging consumers.102 Fourth, “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed,” with an “unexplained large reverse payment
itself . . . normally suggest[ing] that the patentee has serious doubts
about the patent’s survival.”103 Fifth, the Court noted that despite the
risk of antitrust liability involved with a reverse payment settlement,
parties can still settle their lawsuits for reasons other than “maintain[ing] and . . . shar[ing] patent-generated monopoly profits.”104
In support of the Supreme Court’s view that Solvay’s claim
should not have been dismissed, the Court held that district courts
should follow the “Rule of Reason” test in reverse payment settlement cases.105

98.
Id.
99.
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234 (citing FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,
460-61 (2009)).
100.
Id. at 2236.
101.
Id.
102.
Id. The Court cited studies showing that “reverse payment agreements are associated with the presence of higher-than-competitive profits—a strong indication of market
power.” Id.
103.
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
104.
Id.
105.
Id.
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[T]he inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is
whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses competition.
“The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition.”106
Thus, district courts must weigh all the circumstances and determine
if the plaintiff has proven that a reverse payment settlement is destroying competition.107
While the Supreme Court took a big step in finding that pay-fordelay settlements may come with anticompetitive effects, the Court
failed to outlaw these settlements altogether. Furthermore, the Supreme Court did not address the commerce clause issues surrounding
these settlements.108
X. THE BURDEN OF PAY-FOR-DELAY SETTLEMENTS ON INTERSTATE
COMMERCE
A.

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

The United States Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall
have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”109 The Framers’ original intention of the commerce power was to control animosity between the states, such as “hostile state restrictions, retaliatory
trade regulations, and protective tariffs on bank imports from other
states.”110 By controlling retaliation and hostility between the states,
the Framers hoped to create a more cohesive national economy, rather than just a collection of individual state markets.111
106.
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) (citing
Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
107.
See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238. The plaintiff need not show that the settlement
was unfair or unlawful, only whether it suppresses competition. The Court noted that these
settlements need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and that there is a sliding scale in
assessing reasonableness of a settlement. Id. at 2237-39.
108.
Id.
109.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
110.
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 82 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 17th ed. 2010).
111.
See id.
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Since its inception, interpretations of the commerce clause have
varied greatly. The early courts often invalidated congressional action and deferred to the authority of the individual states, whereas
courts after 1937 tended to give Congress great freedom in crafting
laws that regulated national commerce.112
Modern interpretation of the commerce clause recognizes three
general categories that can be regulated by Congress:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of
interstate commerce. Second, Congress is empowered
to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only
from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress' commerce
authority includes the power to regulate those activities . . . that substantially affect interstate commerce.113
B.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND DRUGS

The Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. Raich upheld the power of
Congress to regulate the production of drugs because of their effects
on the national drug market.114 California’s Compassionate Use Act
of 1996 created an exemption from prosecution for users and physicians who cultivate or possess marijuana for medicinal purposes.115
The respondents were ill and required the use of medicinal marijuana
112.
See id. (noting that, at one point, “no law was struck down as exceeding the
reach of the commerce power for nearly six decades”).
113.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). Exemplifying congressional control of the channels of interstate commerce was The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234
U.S. 342 (1914), where the Court upheld congressional action regulating the rates of railroads. Id. Further illustrating the regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce
was Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), where the Court upheld a federal law that
criminalized threatening violence to collect on loans, also known as loan sharking. By outlawing these kinds of activities, Congress aimed to protect people and businesses that were
losing money at the hands of organized crime. See id. at 155. Finally, an example of congressional regulation of activities substantially affecting interstate commerce was Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), where the Court upheld a law that
prevented a motel from refusing to rent rooms to African Americans. The Court reasoned
that this activity discouraged a large portion of African Americans from traveling and thus
substantially affected interstate commerce. Id. at 261.
114.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
115.
Id. at 6.
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per their doctors’ recommendations, prompting them to cultivate
their own personal supply.116 Notwithstanding that their cultivation
was legal under California law, agents from the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration destroyed all respondents’ medical marijuana plants pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act.117
The Court concluded that Congress did not overstep its bounds
in regulating intrastate drug activity.118 The Court noted that the purpose of the Controlled Substances Act was to “control the supply and
demand of controlled substances in both lawful and unlawful drug
markets.”119 The Court reasoned that personal cultivation of marijuana could result in that marijuana entering the market and thereby affect supply and demand.120
Similar to the personal cultivation of marijuana, pay-for-delay
settlements have the potential to greatly alter the market for prescription drugs.121 When a generic drug hits the market, after only one
year it will gain ninety percent of the sales originally held by the
brand name patent holder.122 Further, the generic drugs on average
cost only fifteen percent of the price of the brand name drug.123 Because consumers have alternatives to purchasing high price brand
name drugs, the demand for the brand name drug falls.124 When a
pay-for-delay settlement occurs, the two drug manufacturers prevent
the generic drug from entering the stream of commerce, thus affect-

116.
Id. at 7.
117.
Id. See also 21 U.S.C. § 801(6) (2006) (“Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic.”).
118.
See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 19.
119.
Id.
120.
Id.
121.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 8.
122.
Id.
123.
Id. Recently, brand name manufacturers have begun offering consumers coupons that lower the price of their drugs in order to compete with the much more affordable
generic drugs. Linda A. Johnson, New Coupons Aim to Keep People Off Generic Drugs,
YAHOO! FINANCE (Aug. 20, 2012, 10:45 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/coupons-aimkeep-people-off-143732733.html. These tactics by drug manufacturers reinforce the drastic
effects that generic drugs have on the market. See id. (“‘On a big drug, every day that you
can delay the sales drop is a happy day at the drug company.’”).
124.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 8.
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ing supply and demand in the national market and causing prices to
stay high.125
Gonzalez offers a clear precedent that it is within the purview of
Congress to regulate activities that affect the market conditions for
legal and illegal drugs.126 Thus, because pay-for-delay settlements
greatly affect the market price, supply, and demand of various drugs,
they are unduly burdensome on interstate commerce and should be
regulated by Congress.
C.

DRUG COMPANIES AS AN AGGREGATE CLASS

In Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court defined the “aggregate
approach” to interstate commerce, whereby certain classes of people
or entities were deemed to have a substantial effect upon interstate
commerce.127 Wickard involved the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938, which established a quota that farmers were to follow in the
production of wheat bushels.128 The purpose of the quota was to prevent surplus or shortages that would affect the wheat market.129 Further, the quota would keep supply at a normal level, allowing farmers
to sell their products at higher prices.130 According to the Court, in
1941, farmers who stayed within the quota of the Agricultural Adjustment Act sold their products for an average of $1.16 per bushel,
whereas the world market price was $0.40 per bushel.131 The appellee
exceeded his wheat quota and suffered a monetary penalty as a result.132 He subsequently challenged the validity of the Act, arguing
that his acts were trivial and purely local, thus having no direct substantial effect on interstate commerce.133
The Court found that the “appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself [but] is not enough to remove
him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribu125.
See id. (“[P]atent settlements restricting generic entry finds that agreements with
compensation on average prohibit generic entry for nearly 17 months longer than agreements
without payments.”).
126.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
127.
See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
128.
Id. at 114.
129.
Id. at 115.
130.
Id. at 126.
131.
Id.
132.
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115.
133.
Id.
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tion, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far
from trivial.”134 In simpler terms, under the “aggregate approach,” if
Congress determines that the activities of a class of people, when
combined, have an effect on interstate commerce, then Congress can
regulate that class of people and the individuals within that class.135
The Court based its rationale on the principle that “the power to regulate commerce includes the power to regulate the prices at which
commodities in that commerce are dealt in and practices affecting
such prices.”136 Accordingly, because wheat farming as a whole had
a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the individuals within
that class, including the appellee, could be regulated regardless of the
triviality or local character of their activity.137
In the context of a reverse payment settlement, one such settlement may have a relatively small effect on interstate commerce;
however, the drug companies as an aggregate class have come to
terms on sixty-six settlements between 2004 and 2009, each involving millions of dollars in compensation and substantial delays.138 Further illustrating the substantial effects of this aggregate class on interstate commerce are the estimated yearly costs to American consumers: thirty-five billion dollars.139 Consequently, under the precedent
set by Wickard, any pay-for-delay settlement, regardless of how significant the monetary amounts or the length of delay, can be regulated by Congress under the commerce clause.140

134.
Id. at 127-28.
135.
See id. See also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). In Katzenbach,
the owner of a barbecue restaurant allowed African Americans to carry out food but refused
to allow them to dine-in. Id. at 297. This was in violation of Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, prompting the owner to challenge the validity of the Act. Id. Here, the Court again
used the “aggregate approach” in finding that the local discriminatory actions of the restaurant owner could be regulated because of the substantial effect that discrimination has on
interstate commerce. Id. at 303. In fact, the Court compared the per capita spending of African Americans in highly discriminatory areas with other areas and found it to be much lower
where discrimination was prevalent. Id. at 299.
136.
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128.
137.
Id.
138.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 4.
139.
Id. at 2.
140.
See Wickard, 317 U.S. 111. Under the “aggregate theory,” each individual drug
company that engages in a settlement contributes to the overall effect of reverse payment
settlements on the market for drugs; consequently, each drug company could be regulated by
congressional legislation under the commerce clause. See id.
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CONGRESS, NOT DRUG COMPANIES, CAN REGULATE
PRICES

Wickard clearly held that the commerce power grants Congress
the right to regulate practices affecting the price of commodities in
the stream of commerce.141 Reverse payment settlements prevent
generic drugs from entering the stream of commerce, thereby preventing competition and allowing the brand name manufacturers to
keep their prices high.142 As noted earlier, the average price of a generic drug is only fifteen percent of the brand name price prior to
generic entry.143 Based on these statistics, it is clear that reverse
payment settlements drastically affect the price of drugs in the stream
of commerce.144 The right to regulate the prices of commodities in
the stream of commerce is not reserved for private drug companies,
but rather for Congress, through the commerce clause.145 Accordingly, drug companies must not be allowed to engage in regulating practices that result in drastic effects to the drug market.146
The congressional Act at issue in Wickard, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938,147 is an excellent illustration of Congress’s
reserved right to regulate the practices affecting the price of commodities in the stream of commerce.148 Essentially, the government is
engaging in a reverse payment settlement with American farmers.
The government is providing agricultural subsidies for farmers in
exchange for farmers not releasing crops past a certain set quota into
the stream of commerce.149 Consistent with Congress’s right to regulate the prices of commodities, the “general purpose of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, insofar as it relates to wheat, is to control production in order to avoid the problems resulting from deficits or sur-

141.
Id. at 128.
142.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 3.
143.
Id. at 8.
144.
Id. at 3.
145.
See Wickard, 317 U.S. 111.
146.
Id.
147.
7 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2012) (“Whenever farm marketing quotas are in effect with
respect to any crop of cotton, the producer shall be subject to a penalty on the farm marketing excess at a rate per pound equal to 50 per centum of the parity price per pound.”).
148.
See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114.
149.
See id. at 131 (“It is hardly lack of due process for the Government to regulate
that which it subsidizes.”).
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pluses.”150 It follows, then, that the power to engage in quasi-reverse
payment settlements that affect commodity markets falls within Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. Because the commerce clause grants Congress this power, it does not follow that drug
companies share this congressional power.
Brand name drug manufacturers enter into reverse payment settlements in order to prevent competition and avoid over-saturation of
the market that would result in decreased drug prices.151 Through
these agreements, drug manufacturers are regulating the price of
drugs.152 Because the power to regulate the price of commodities is
reserved for Congress, reverse payment settlements are unduly burdensome on interstate commerce.153
E.

RECENT LIMITS ON THE COMMERCE POWER

Cases decided by the Supreme Court under the commerce clause
since 1995 have tended to restrict the power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce. In United States v. Lopez, the Court, for the first
time in fifty years, invalidated a law based on it exceeding the scope
of the commerce power.154 In Lopez,155 the Court struck down the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a crime for “any
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.”156
The defendant was arrested after arriving at school with a .38 caliber
handgun and five bullets in his possession.157 The law was challenged as an unconstitutional exercise of congressional control over
public schools.158 The government argued that the law was simply an
exercise of the commerce power because possession of guns in
schools would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.159
150.
U.S. v. Stangland, 242 F.2d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 1957). See also Wickard, 317
U.S. at 131 (noting that that individual supply needed to be regulated in order to avoid surpluses and shortages of wheat).
151.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 1.
152.
See id.
153.
See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128.
154.
See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 593 (1995).
155.
Id. at 551.
156.
Id. (citing Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A)
(2012)).
157.
Id. at 551.
158.
Id.
159.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.
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Specifically, they argued that guns in schools would cause insurance
prices to rise as a result of increased violent acts.160 Further, the government argued that violence in schools would negatively impact
education, thereby creating a less productive workforce.161 The Court
rejected the government’s arguments for three main reasons: the conduct regulated was in no way an economic activity,162 there was no
jurisdictional nexus ensuring that the conduct affected commerce,163
and the law essentially granted Congress broad police powers that
were reserved to the states.164
Despite these recent limitations on the commerce power, payfor-delay settlements are still within the purview of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. In Lopez, the Court broadly defined an economic activity as one that, if repeated, would substantially affect interstate commerce.165 This definition is analogous to the
“aggregate approach” as defined in Wickard.166 An activity that is
performed by a specific class of people is necessarily a repeated activity.167 Further, both the “aggregate approach” and the Lopez defi-

160.
Id. at 564 (“[T]he presence of guns in schools poses a substantial threat to the
educational process by threatening the learning environment. A handicapped educational
process, in turn, will result in a less productive citizenry.”).
161.
Id.
162.
The Court found that “[t]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no
sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any
sort of interstate commerce.” Id. at 567.
163.
The Court notes that neither the statute itself nor its legislative history contained
any language evidencing a connection between interstate commerce and regulation of guns
in schools. Id. at 562. As a result, the statute lacked the requisite jurisdictional element connecting the possessed firearms with interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562.
164.
The Court recognized that upholding a law that has such a tenuous connection
to interstate commerce would essentially turn Congress’s commerce power into a broad
police power that would interfere with the states’ constitutional rights. Id. at 567. The Court
used these same three factors to decide United States v. Morrison five years later. See United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). In Morrison, a female student at Virginia Tech was
raped by two other students and sought a civil remedy under the Violence Against Women
Act. Id. at 605. The Act provided civil relief for the victims of violent crimes motivated by
gender. Id. In invalidating the law, the Court found that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.” Id. at 613. Next, the Court held
that civil remedies have no connection to interstate commerce and thus the statute lacks the
requisite jurisdictional nexus. Id. at 609. Further, the Court recognized that there is a distinction between national and local activity and that violent crimes are local activity that must be
policed by the states. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
165.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
166.
See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
167.
Id.
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nition require that the repeated activity have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.168
The statistics and the purpose behind pay-for-delay settlements
make it clear that these agreements constitute economic activities as
they are defined in Lopez.169 Drug manufacturers enter into reverse
payment settlements in order to “permit the sharing of monopoly
rents between would-be competitors.”170 By doing so, the brand
name drug manufacturers are able to keep the generic drugs off the
market, keep the prices on their drugs high, and maximize their profits.171 Furthermore, as noted earlier, reverse payment settlements are
a common trend among drug manufacturers with sixty-six settlements being entered into between 2004 and 2009.172 These settlements substantially affect interstate commerce by preserving $20 billion worth of sales made by brand name drug manufacturers and
costing the American public $3.5 billion annually.173 Based on these
numbers, it is clear that pay-for-delay settlements are an oft-repeated
agreement among various drug manufacturers that substantially affect interstate commerce.174 Thus, because every element of the
Lopez definition is satisfied, pay-for-delay settlements are an economic activity.175
Additionally, while pay-for-delay settlements do not explicitly
address their connection to interstate commerce within the contract,
this connection can be implied through the jurisdictional nexus.176
Reverse payment settlements obviously involve drugs.177 Drugs are
not limited to a specific jurisdiction or a specific population; rather,
the majority of the American public uses them in different capacities.
Thus, the use of drugs spans every jurisdiction in the country,178 creating a jurisdictional nexus between purchase of prescription drugs
and interstate commerce.179 Because pay-for-delay settlements affect
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 216 (3d Cir. 2012).
See id. at 208.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 4.
See id. at 2.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
See id.
See id. at 562.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 1.
See id.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562.
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the availability and pricing of prescription drugs, this jurisdictional
nexus necessarily implicates a connection between these agreements
and interstate commerce.180
Finally, legislation curtailing the power of drug companies to enter into pay-for-delay settlements would not create an overly broad
police power in Congress.181 In Lopez, the Court declined to uphold
the law because it required them to “pile inference upon inference in
a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under
the commerce clause to a general police power of the sort retained by
the States.”182 The connection between interstate commerce and reverse payment settlements is not so tenuous. Case law and statistical
evidence previously alluded to point to these agreements being unduly burdensome on interstate commerce.183 Because proposed legislation would be narrowly tailored to a specific activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, it would not be overly broad and
would not give Congress a blank check to legislate any activity Congress desired.184
Moreover, the activities that Congress aimed to regulate in both
Lopez and Morrison involved violence prevention.185 The Morrison
Court noted that “[t]he regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods
involved in interstate commerce has always been the province of the
States.”186 These cases seem to indicate that the Court is not willing
to rely on the commerce clause in order to uphold legislation concerning local violence that is not strongly connected to interstate
commerce.187 This contention is further supported by Perez v. United
States, where the Court upheld a law forbidding loan sharking.188
While the legislation in Perez aimed to prevent violence associated
with loan sharking, the regulated activity was so closely connected to
interstate commerce that the Court found it was within Congress’s
180.
See id.
181.
See id. at 567.
182.
Id.
183.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 1.
184.
See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
185.
See id. (discussing gun possession in schools); U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (discussing violence against women).
186.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
187.
See id.; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
188.
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); see also supra text accompanying
note 73.
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power to regulate.189 Unlike these precedents, legislation against payfor-delay settlements would not aim to prevent violent crimes.190 Rather, legislation proposing to end these agreements would involve an
economic activity that is strongly connected to interstate commerce,
thus not interfering with the individual states’ police power.191
Despite the limits that the Supreme Court defined in Lopez in
1995, legislation proposing to end pay-for-delay settlements would
nonetheless survive commerce clause scrutiny.192 These settlements
represent an economic activity that contains a jurisdictional nexus,
and do not give Congress a plenary police power that is meant for the
states.193 Because none of the limits enumerated in Lopez are implicated, it is within the purview of Congress to pass legislation ending
pay-for-delay settlements.194
F.

REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS AND “OBAMACARE”

The most recent Supreme Court case interpreting Congress’s
power under the commerce clause, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, involved the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.195 This piece of legislation was introduced by the
Obama administration and was intended to “increase the number of
Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of
health care.”196 The central part of the bill, called the “individual
mandate,”197 requires that individuals maintain “minimum essential”
health care.198 If people choose not to comply with the “individual
mandate” and forego the directive to acquire health insurance cover189.
Id.
190.
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567; Perez, 402 U.S. 146.
191.
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567; Perez, 402 U.S. 146.
192.
See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
193.
See id.
194.
See id.
195.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012).
196.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2580.
197.
Id. at 2578. The “individual mandate” of the bill does not apply to certain classes, such as prisoners and undocumented aliens. Id. at 2580; 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d).
198.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2579. The opinion notes that many people will receive
health insurance coverage from non-private sources such as Medicare, Medicaid, the CHIP
program, or employee health insurance. Id.; 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f). If people are not receiving healthcare from one of these sources, then the “individual mandate” requires them to
purchase a minimum coverage private health plan. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2580.
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age, then they are assessed a “penalty” which is calculated based on a
percentage of household income.199
The Government argued unsuccessfully to the Court that the
“individual mandate” was a valid exercise of Congress’s power under
the commerce clause.200 The Government argued that health care in
America is plagued by a “cost-shifting” problem, where hospitals are
required to provide services to many individuals who are unable to
afford the services rendered.201 As a result, “[t]o recoup the losses,
hospitals pass on the cost to insurers through higher rates, and insurers, in turn, pass on the cost to policy holders in the form of higher
premiums,”202 causing a substantial and detrimental effect on interstate commerce.203
In denying the Government’s contentions, the Court, in a five-tofour decision, refused to extend Congress’s commerce power to inactivity.204 The Court found, that in order for Congress to regulate a
certain activity, this activity must already exist.205 In simpler terms,
Congress can regulate individuals intertwined in some way with interstate commerce, but Congress cannot force individuals to become
intertwined with interstate commerce.206 Consistent with other recent
limits on the commerce power, the Court held that allowing legislation of inactivity would give Congress a blank check to regulate eve-

199.
26 U.S.C. § 5000A. The bill calls this penalty a “shared responsibility payment.” Id. The payment is “subject to a floor based on a specified dollar amount and a ceiling based on the average annual premium the individual would have to pay for qualifying
private health insurance.” Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2580. For example, the Court states that in
2016, the “penalty will be 2.5 percent of an individual's household income, but no less than
$695 and no more than the average yearly premium for [their] insurance . . . .” Id. See also
26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c).
200.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2585.
201.
Id. at 2585.
202.
Id.
203.
Id. Specifically, the government argues that by requiring individuals to have
health insurance, the “cost-shifting” problem will be avoided. Id.
204.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (“The Commerce Clause is not a general license to
regulate an individual from cradle to grave, simply because he will predictably engage in
particular transactions.”). It should also be noted that the “individual mandate” was ultimately upheld under Congress’s taxing power. Id. at 2595.
205.
Id. at 2586.
206.
See id. at 2587.
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ry aspect of people’s lives, even if the activity regulated was only
hypothetically connected to interstate commerce. 207
While Sebelius sets a clear line in further limiting commerce
clause power to active conduct, it is clear that pay-for-delay settlement legislation would not fall within this limitation.208 Pay-for-delay
settlements are not hypothetical and are a major factor in the availability of generic drugs and their prices.209 Drug manufacturers have
been actively engaging in these types of agreements for decades in
order to keep out competition and maximize profits on the resulting
monopoly.210 This is distinct from the reasoning of the Sebelius
Court, which refused to compel people to participate in an activity
that had not yet occurred.211 Pay-for-delay settlements have already
occurred and are a regular practice among drug manufacturers.212
Furthermore, when drug manufacturers decide to market a drug, the
manufacturer has already made the decision to place the drug into the
stream of commerce and become intertwined with interstate commerce. Therefore, legislation designed to end pay-for-delay settlements would not be compelling individuals to become active in
commerce since the actors are already actively involved in commerce.213 Because legislation would not be regulating inactivity, but
rather a prevalent, existing practice, the limitations on the commerce
clause articulated by the Sebelius Court would not be implicated, and
it would be within Congress’s power to regulate reverse payment
settlements.214
Additionally, many of the policy reasons cited for drafting the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act are also prevalent in a
pay-for-delay context.215 The primary goals of this bill were to increase the number of people covered by health insurance and to decrease the costs of health insurance coverage so as to protect people
from the enormous financial burdens associated with medical ser207.
See id. The Court specifically distinguished Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942), finding that Congress’s legislation in Wickard was a valid exercise of the commerce
clause power since the farmer was actively producing wheat. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2857.
208.
See id. at 2591.
209.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 3.
210.
See id. at 1.
211.
See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2591.
212.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 3.
213.
See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2591.
214.
See id.
215.
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012).
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vices.216 Going hand-in-hand with this goal is an increase in the
quantity of generic drugs on the market. By increasing the availability of generic drugs, the competition would necessarily cause prices
to decrease.217 Consequently, lower drug prices would lower the cost
of health insurance premiums, thereby making it easier for people to
afford coverage.218 This would prevent more people from being
forced to “cut their pills in half or skip needed medications altogether” as a result of high prescription drug prices.219 Because Congress’s
main goals in passing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
were to increase the number of people covered by health insurance
and decrease the cost of health insurance, it logically follows that
Congress should pass legislation ending pay-for-delay settlements
since this legislation would help achieve the same goals.220
XI. BENEFITS OF ELIMINATING PAY-FOR-DELAY SETTLEMENTS
A 2009 report by the Obama Administration’s Office of Management and Budget stated that in its effort to reduce drug prices,
“[t]he Administration will prevent drug companies from blocking
generic drugs from consumers by prohibiting anticompetitive agreements and collusion between brand name and generic drug manufacturers intended to keep generic drugs off the market.”221 This recognition by the president of the troublesome nature of these settlements
is further evidence that pay-for-delay settlements are very problematic and come with a great cost to the American public.222
Congressional action that would render pay-for-delay settlements per se illegal would have many benefits to the American con216.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2580. “Everyone will eventually need health care at a
time and to an extent they cannot predict.” Id. at 2585.
217.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 1.
218.
See Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the Center for
American Progress: “Pay-for-Delay” Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: How Congress Can Stop Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect Consumer’ [sic] Wallets, and Help Pay for
Health Care Reform (The $35 Billion Solution) at 3 (June 23, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/090623payfordelayspeech.pdf.
219.
Id. at 4.
220.
See id.; 26 U.S.C. § 5000A.
221.
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, A NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY:
RENEWING AMERICA’S PROMISE 28 (2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/fy2010_new_era/A_New_Era_of_Responsibility2.p
df.
222.
See id.
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sumer, healthcare, and the economy as a whole.223 Primarily, barring
reverse payment settlements would result in much lower prescription
drug prices for the American consumer.224 Studies and history show
that “when multiple generics are on the market, the price for the generic version can drop more than 90 percent below the price of the
branded product . . . .”225 Obviously, this would lead to great savings
to the American consumer on prescription drugs.226 To put this in
perspective, a month supply of the generic version of Zantec, a drug
preventing ulcers, is available for $3, whereas the brand name drug
would cost $111.227 Furthermore, pay-for-delay settlements delay
entry of the generic drug into the stream of commerce by an average
of seventeen months.228 In the Zantec example, seventeen months of
paying the brand name price rather than the generic price would cost
a consumer $1,836.229 Estimates by the FTC indicate that a per se bar
on pay-for-delay settlements would save consumers at least $35 billion over a ten-year period and up to $75 billion over this period.230
Additionally, ending reverse payment settlements would greatly
buoy the American healthcare system. Because the federal government pays for a large portion of the country’s overall prescription
drug costs, the FTC estimates that the federal government would save
at least $12 billion over a ten-year period and up to $25 billion over
this period.231 These savings could then be used to fund and improve
federal healthcare programs, such as Medicaid or Medicare. Furthermore, as noted earlier, a decrease in prescription drug prices would
lead to a decrease in health care premiums, allowing more affordability and access to private insurance.232
Not only will a per se bar to pay-for-delay settlements aid the
healthcare system, but it will help spur the economy as a whole by
increasing innovation and competition. The Supreme Court once not223.
See Leibowitz, supra note 218, at 10-11.
224.
See id. at 8.
225.
Id. at 3. Because the Hatch-Waxman Act requires that each reverse payment
settlement is filed with the FTC, the FTC claims that they are in the best position to analyze
the economics and statistics surrounding reverse payment settlements. Id. at 7.
226.
Id. at 3.
227.
Leibowitz, supra note 218, at 3.
228.
Id. at 4.
229.
See id. at 3.
230.
Id. at 8.
231.
Id.
232.
See Leibowitz, supra note 218, at 3.
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ed that “[g]ranting patent protection to advances that would occur in
the ordinary course without real innovation retards progress . . . .”233
In the pay-for-delay context, a brand name drug manufacturer is most
inclined to pay off its would-be competitors when they are aware of
the weakness of their patent.234 Thus, the brand name manufacturer,
without any real innovation, is reaping the maximum rewards for
drugs that likely would not be afforded patent protection if challenged.235 Moreover, because of the precedent set by previous payfor-delay settlements, generic manufacturers are encouraged to file
patent challenges under the Hatch-Waxman Act solely to attempt to
coax the brand name manufacturers into settlements for large monetary sums, rather than filing challenges based on actual medical innovation.236 By barring these agreements, manufacturers will be forced
to have strong patents and actual innovation in order to withstand
generic patent challenges.
Furthermore, the Hatch-Waxman Act was passed with the intention of increasing competition in the market by making it easier for
generic drugs to challenge weak drug patents.237 However, pay-fordelay settlements have resulted in the exact opposite effect: weak
drug patents circumventing the generic challenges, resulting in fewer
generic drugs and less market competition.238 Legislation ending reverse payment settlements would allow the Hatch-Waxman Act to
operate as Congress originally intended, increasing competition in
the marketplace.239
XII. CONCLUSION
Lofty research and development costs, and the desire to maximize profits, lead many drug manufacturers to enter into reverse payment settlements with generic drug makers. While these settlements
may seem like sound business judgments, they present a clash between antitrust law, patent law, and constitutional law principles.
233.
E.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 402 (2007).
234.
See Leibowitz, supra note 218, at 6.
235.
See id.
236.
See id. at 5 (“Instead of competing to be first to come to market, generic companies compete to be first to get paid off.”).
237.
See id. at 3.
238.
See id.
239.
See Leibowitz, supra note 218, at 6.
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Courts have traditionally focused their analysis on the interplay between antitrust and patent law. However, the blatant commerce
clause implications of reverse payment settlements strongly point to
the conclusion that they are in violation of constitutional law principles.
Statistics and case law discussing pay-for-delay settlements
point to these agreements costing American consumers billions of
dollars by forcing generic competition out and keeping prescription
drug prices high.240 Because of the substantial, detrimental effect of
these agreements on consumers’ wallets, the healthcare system, and
the nation’s economy, it would be sound public policy for either
Congress to pass legislation declaring reverse payment settlements
per se illegal, or for the Supreme Court to outlaw these agreements as
unduly burdensome on interstate commerce.
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